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L. Alexander

equally effective means of reaching his intended audience with his message. I think it fair to surmise that the
Court did not really mean what it said in O’Brien on this point, or that if it did, it will ignore what it said and
render its error harmless.

2. Addendum
A related issue: Some free speech jurisprudence turns on the idea that some types of speech are “low value”
speech, and that other types of speech lack any redeeming social value. (So-called “adult” books and movies are
said to belong to the “low value” category (Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 1976); hard-core pornography is said to belong to the “no value” category (Miller v. California, 1973; Roth v. United States, 1957)).
But there is a major problem with assigning value to types of speech, a problem analogous to the so-called
“denominator” problem in takings jurisprudence. (That problem stems from the Supreme Court’s making the
determination of a regulatory taking turn on the effect of the regulation on the parcel taken as a whole, which
seems arbitrary because both space and time can be infinitely divided or added to (Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 1992)).
The analog of the denominator problem for low and no-value speech can be easily illustrated6. Suppose a
medical text in the public library is only looked at by people pruriently interested in its pictures of naked men
and women. For its actual audience, it functions as pornography. On the other hand, suppose some hard-core
porn—Debbie Does Dallas, say—is used in several college classrooms and research projects for the purpose of
examining human sexual psychology, the sociology of deviant sexuality, or some other serious scholarly purpose. One might conclude that for purposes of determining the value of some speech token, one should use as
the denominator the larger environment in which it occurs—much as one does not isolate its sexual descriptions
from the rest of Lady Chatterley’s Lover, or a steamy sex scene from a high-brow movie. In terms of the overall
context, the medical text may be low or no value, whereas Debbie Does Dallas may be very high value.
Of course, once one appreciates that a speech token’s value is a product of its broader context, we will see
how hard it is to determine a speech token’s value. Perhaps the scholarly research using Debbie Does Dalles will
itself turn out to be valueless or even harmful. Perhaps the prurient use of the medical text will produce some
unanticipated benefit. The contextual lens can be ever and ever widened spatially and temporarily, just as it can
be narrowed to the sex scene within a high-brow book or movie.
The focus should be, not on the value of the speech type or token, but on why government is regulating what
it is regulating.
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